This article comments on Jörn Griebel and Milan Plücken's recent analysis in the Leiden Journal of International Law of the International Court of Justice's approach to state responsibility in its judgment in the Genocide (Bosnia v. Serbia) case. The article also provides more general remarks on the law of state responsibility as it pertains to acts of non-state actors. In that regard, it discusses attribution based on de facto organ status and attribution based on direction and control, as well as whether, as a matter of policy, the law of state responsibility meets the needs of the modern world.
Introduction
In their article in the latest issue of this Journal, was the only rule capable of assigning de facto organ status to non-state actors. In Griebel and Plücken's view, the Court erred finally when it failed to take into account recent developments in state practice that point to more flexible rules of attribution.
Much of the critique that Griebel and Plücken levy against the Court is reasonable and insightful. This is especially so with their policy arguments, to which I will turn last.
However, much of their criticism is based on what can only be termed as their own idiosyncratic reading of the Genocide judgment. Many of the Court's supposed arguments that they proceed to demolish with aplomb are in fact nothing but straw men they themselves have created. At times their analysis also suffers because of their failure to appreciate the broader context of the Genocide case, the arguments of the parties and the evidence that they actually presented to the Court.
5
In the Genocide judgment, the ICJ first established that, according to evidence presented to it, the only instance of genocide committed during the conflict in Bosnia and
As with the Genocide case, this case will also largely turn (if it proceeds to the merits) on Russia's responsibility for the acts of what are prima facie nonstate actors, the separatist Georgian entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as certain paramilitary groups. Questions of state responsibility for acts of non-state actors are thus alive both before the Court and outside it, and the Genocide judgment, as the Court's most recent foray into the issue, is a crucially important precedent.
In addressing Griebel and Plücken's critique of the judgment, I will proceed in the order of their own argument. First to be discussed is Article 8 ASR. Herzegovina was the July 1995 massacre of some eight thousand Bosnian Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica at the hands of the Bosnian Serb army. The Court then proceeded to establish whether Serbia was responsible for the acts of the Bosnian Serbs in Srebrenica, and did so by using a two-step approach.
Attribution under Article 8 ASR and De Facto Organs
It first posed the question whether the Srebrenica genocide was perpetrated by organs of Serbia, and responded to that question in the negative. In the Court's view, none of the perpetrators of the genocide enjoyed organ status under Serbian internal law, per
Article 4(1) ASR.
6 "determine . . . whether or not the relationship of the contras to the United States Government was so much one of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it would be right to equate the contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or as acting on behalf of that Government" (p. 62).
That, however, did not exhaust the Court's enquiry into the possible organ status of the genocidaires, as it remained to be established whether the Republika Srpska and its armed forces were Serbian organs de facto:
The first issue raised by this argument is whether it is possible in principle to attribute to a State conduct of persons -or groups of persons -who while they do not have the legal status of State organs, in fact act under such strict control by the State that they must be treated as its organs for purposes of the necessary attribution leading to the State's responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The Court has in fact already addressed this question, and given an answer to it in principle, in Thus, it was to be determined whether the relationship between Serbia on the one hand, and the Bosnian Serb entity, the Republika Srpska, on the other, was so much of (complete) dependence on one side and control on the other so as to render the Bosnian The plain reading of the wording is that the ICJ is of the opinion that the responsibility incurred by the state under Article 8 of the ILC Articles flows from the conduct of the state's organs in giving the instructions or exercising the control in question, as opposed to the action of the instructed or controlled entities.
Considering that the function of the attribution rules is to attribute to the state the conduct of persons who have acted against international law, the Court's refusal to consider the persons acting under such instructions or control as de facto organs, and its foundation of responsibility in Article 8 situations on the wrongfulness of the state organs' instructions or control, entirely stripped Article 8 of the ILC Articles of its character as an attribution rule.
In their view, 12 Griebel and Plücken then spend several pages of their article explaining (quite correctly) that Article 8 ASR is in fact an attribution rule, and that any different conception of Article 8 would be entirely mistaken. 13 As they interpret the Genocide judgment, the Court thought of Article 8 as some sort of primary rule, as a separate wrongful act of directing or controlling the perpetrators of genocide, distinct from the commission of genocide as such.
14 9 Genocide judgment, paras. 408-413. 10 Griebel and Plücken, supra note 1, at 606. 11 Griebel and Plücken, supra note 1, at 607 (emphasis and annotation theirs). 12 Ibid. 13 Griebel and Plücken, supra note 1, at 607-611. 14 Griebel and Plücken, supra note 1, at 608.
They express their surprise that so far none of the academic commentators of the Court's judgment have spotted this quite glaring error in the Court's reasoning. 15 Griebel and Plücken are further dismayed by the fact that none of the Court's judges, at least five of whom were members of the ILC who participated in its work on the ASR, 16 criticized the Court's approach to Article 8 ASR. 17 In their mind, the only explanation for the judges' silence on the matter is that they did not 'fully realize' that the Court was actually abolishing Article 8 ASR as a rule of attribution.
18
Having thus explained the interrelationship among the three issues set out above (paragraph 379), the Court will now proceed to consider the first of them. As formulated, article 7 only applies to the conduct of an organ of a State or of an entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority, i.e. only to those cases of attribution covered by articles 4, 5 and 6. Problems of unauthorized conduct by other persons, groups or entities give rise to distinct problems, which are dealt with separately under articles 8, 9 and 10.
by its own terms applies only to a state's organs or persons empowered by it to exercise elements of governmental authority.
That rule conceptually cannot and does not apply to the attribution of acts by non-state organs under Articles 8-11 ASR, which are not based solely on the identity of the actor, but require positive proof of state control, instructions or adoption of the specific act that is being attributed. In the words of the ILC, 39 The greatest practical difference between attribution under a de facto organ theory and attribution under Articles 8-11 ASR is not in that Article 7 ASR applies to the former but not to the latter, but in the steps that one needs to take to actually prove, under the applicable evidentiary standard, the facts necessary for attribution to occur. [P]ersons, groups of persons or entities may, for purposes of international responsibility, be equated with State organs even if that status does not follow from internal law, provided that in fact the persons, groups or entities act in "complete dependence" on the State, of which they are ultimately merely the instrument. In such a case, it is appropriate to look beyond legal status alone, in order to grasp the reality of the relationship between the person taking action, and the State to which he is so closely attached as to appear to be nothing more than its agent: any other solution would allow States to escape their international responsibility by choosing to act through persons or entities whose supposed independence would be purely fictitious. … However, so to equate persons or entities with State organs when they do not have that status under internal law must be exceptional, for it requires proof of a particularly great degree of State control over them, a relationship which the Court's [Nicaragua] Judgment quoted above expressly described as "complete dependence".
Let us now examine each of these arguments in turn.
First, to see whether the complete control test is overly demanding it is necessary to see why the test is as strict as it is. As the Court explains it, 45 Thus, it is the exceptional nature of assigning organ status to an entity which does not have such status under a state's domestic law that warrants a strict test. Doctrinally, the purpose of the test is to prevent states from avoiding responsibility merely by changing the provisions of their own domestic law.
46
To that Griebel and Plücken respond that it is hard to envisage the complete control test being satisfied without a simultaneous proof that the specific acts of the entity in question were at the same time effectively controlled by the state. This is so because it is necessary to prove that an organ acted in official capacity for attribution to occur (something that is not at all in doubt, and that both the ICJ and the ILC naturally accept).
As explained above, the reason why a connection between a state and a de facto organ must be intense is that the mere identity of the actor as a state organ suffices for attribution to occur. 48 Griebel and Plücken, supra note 1, at 613. 49 Griebel and Plücken, supra note 1, at 614. 50 Griebel and Plücken, supra note 1, at 614. 51 Genocide judgment, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, paras. 36-39. 52 Griebel and Plücken, supra note 1, at 618-619.
-is exactly like the complete control test in that it looks at a state's control over an actor at a general level.
Where the two tests differ is in the intensity of the connection required. Thus, pursuant to the complete control test, it is necessary to establish that the relationship between a state and a non-state actor is one of complete 'dependence on the one side and control on the other,' so that the non-state actor is in fact a mere instrument of the state, from which it has no real independence or autonomy. 53 It is crucial to again recall that because the case was jurisdictionally strictly confined to genocide, and because the only instance of genocide during the whole Bosnian conflict that the Court could establish was Srebrenica, the Court's analysis of Serbia's responsibility was confined solely to the Srebrenica events in July 1995. However, the amount of control that the authorities of Serbia exercised over the Bosnian Serbs was not equal for the duration of the entire conflict. Indeed, it lessened over time, as rifts between the Serbian leadership and that of the Bosnian Serbs became more and more pronounced.
In 1992, which was the bloodiest year of the war by far, the Bosnian Serb campaign of ethnic cleansing was at its peak, with more than half of all civilian casualties of the entire conflict occurring in just a couple of months of that year. 58 Griebel and Plücken's last piece of purely doctrinal criticism is perhaps their most persuasive. Namely, they argue that in its work on the ASR, the ILC never considered control-based tests of attribution when it formulated Article 4, dealing with attribution by virtue of organ status.
That is when Belgrade's control over the Bosnian Serbs was at its highest, and when the former Yugoslav National Army (JNA) was still in effect operating in Bosnia. The paragraph from the Court's judgment quoted above is filled with caveats that were designed precisely to address the 2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State. 60 Genocide judgment, para. 385 ff. 61 Griebel and Plücken, supra note 1, at 614.
It is worth noting that none of the former ILC members sitting on the Court's bench saw anything incompatible between the complete control test for the purpose of establishing de facto organ status and Article 4 ASR.
Last to be examined are Griebel and Plücken's policy and de lege ferenda arguments, to which I now turn.
Are the Court's Two Tests Good Enough for the Modern World?
The most important question raised by Griebel and Plücken is not whether the 65 Namely, a possibility was raised in the literature that the response of the international community to these attacks, specifically the practically unanimous belief that the United States invasion of Afghanistan was a lawful exercise of self-defence, indicated the birth of a new rule that a state which harbours terrorists, i.e. allows them to operate from within its territory unimpeded, is responsible for any and all acts of such groups. 66 Indeed, President Bush issued a declaration stating such a doctrine in so many terms.
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This nice syllogism is what Griebel and Plücken have in mind when they express their regret at the Court's failure to address it. This nice syllogism is also unfortunately troubled by a potentially flawed premise, which is that Article 51 of the Charter actually This argument is predicated on an interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter as requiring not only that an armed attack be committed against a state, but also for that attack to be attributable to another state against which the attacked state is to respond.
Since the US invasion of Afghanistan was considered to be a lawful exercise of selfdefence, so the argument goes, and since Article 51 requires attribution, the state of Afghanistan must have been held responsible by the international community for the September 11 attacks. As these attacks could not have been attributed to Afghanistan under any of the rules of attribution articulated in the ASR, a new rule of attribution -the harbouring of terrorists -must have emerged. 65 Griebel and Plücken, supra note 1, at 618. 66 In other words, far from it being clear that the September 11 attacks redefined the rules of attribution, it could be that they had no impact whatsoever on the law of state responsibility. On the other hand, it could also be that we are currently in some sort of legal limbo, waiting for the affirmation of a new rule of attribution, the Bush doctrine on harbouring, through subsequent state practice. It would not be the first such time.
and which Griebel and Plücken fail to even mention, even though resolving this controversy of the jus ad bellum is logically a necessary prerequisite for deciding on harbouring as a rule of attribution. 83 Griebel and Plücken, supra note 1, at 620. 84 It should be noted that attribution is truly a core concept of the law of responsibility. Though lex specialis rules of attribution are conceptually possible, the ILC made no reference to any such rule in its ASR commentary. ASR Commentary, at 356-Creating such rules would undermine the value of having a general international law of wrongs in the first place. As the Court put it in the Genocide case, such a rule has to be clearly established. It is moreover difficult to justify why there should be a special rule of attribution, say, for terrorism, but not for genocide. Is terrorism really that much more dangerous for the international community than genocide? Hardly so.
actually diminish the political importance and autonomy of these actors by fictitiously turning them all into state agents.
At any rate, the outcome of this policy debate is in the years and decades to come. change, but it is yet to be demonstrated that the rules articulated by the ILC and the ICJ have actually changed or have proven to be inadequate. In that regard, much of the current critique of the supposedly great stringency of the rules of attribution is in fact directed at other controversies of international law, such as those pertaining to the jus ad bellum. As argued above, these problems should be addressed on their own merits, not through the medium of state responsibility.
55, at 651, who argues that the burden was on the ICJ to disprove the customary nature of the overall control test. It must be said that Cassese is quite right to point out that the Court's holdings suffer from a 'tinge of oracularity' and that the Court should have engaged more fully with the precedents cited in support of the overall control test by the Tadić Appeals Chamber.
